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- Title
Does Democratic Theory Need Epistemic Standards? Grounds for a Purely Procedural Defense of Majority Rule.
- Authors
Invernizzi-Accetti, Carlo
- Abstract
This article proposes a critical discussion of an increasingly influential strand of contemporary democratic theory that attempts to justify majoritarian institutions on the grounds that they are the most adequate "epistemic" means for discovering and implementing an objective standard of normative truth. The analysis is divided in two parts. In the first I show that the appeal to such epistemic standards is unnecessary because it is possible to justify majority rule on the "purely procedural" grounds that it is the best way of instantiating the values of freedom (as consent) and equality (as impartiality). In the second part I suggest that the appeal to epistemic standards is also undesirable because it conflicts with three key democratic values: autonomy (as self-government), inclusion (as lack of discrimination in terms of political competence), and pluralism (as fair representation of conflicting interests within the political process).
- Subjects
DEMOCRACY; POLITICAL science; EPISTEMICS; PLURALISM; CONSENT (Law); POLITICAL autonomy; REPRESENTATIVE government
- Publication
Democratic Theory, 2017, Vol 4, Issue 2, p3
- ISSN
2332-8894
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.3167/dt.2017.040202