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- Title
PATENT BREADTH IN AN INTERNATIONAL SETTING.
- Authors
Bond, Eric W.; Zissimos, Ben
- Abstract
We examine the Nash equilibria of a game where two national governments set patent breadth strategically. Broader patents make R&D more attractive, but the effect on static efficiency is nonmonotonic. In a North-South model, where only the North can innovate, harmonization of patent breadth lowers welfare relative to the Nash equilibrium. When both countries can innovate, harmonization toward narrower patent breadth may raise world welfare. ( JEL F02, F13, O3, O31, O32)
- Subjects
PATENT law; NASH equilibrium; GAME theory in economics; INTERNATIONAL unification of law; WORLD Trade Organization; STRATEGIC planning; DEVELOPED countries; PRACTICAL politics
- Publication
Economic Inquiry, 2017, Vol 55, Issue 3, p1538
- ISSN
0095-2583
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/ecin.12440