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- Title
ARE CITY MANAGERS GREEDY BUREAUCRATS?
- Authors
Bartle, John R.; Korosec, Ronnie LaCourse
- Abstract
This article examines the difference in contracting out between city manager cities and cities with other forms of governance in the U.S. as of March 1996. William A. Niskanen's theory of bureaucracy has been a source of much debate and research. The theory assumes that utility-maximizing bureaucrats will seek to maximize their agency's discretionary budget. A central implication of this theory is that bureaus will supply output inefficiently or in quantities greater than that desired by citizens. The authors test Niskanen's hypothesis by examining the decision of cities to contract out for services. Their premise is that city managers fit the characteristics of the greedy bureaucrat Niskanen describes. If his theory is valid, then city managers should be expected to avoid contracting out because it would expose their discretionary budget and make it more difficult to use for their own purposes. Contracting out is one form of privatization. Privatization increases the service production and delivery options available to government managers. Niskanen derives a model that assumes the bureaucrats maximize utility based on their income and their perquisites. These, in turn, are based on a bureau's output and its discretionary budget.
- Subjects
UNITED States; CITY managers; CONTRACTING out; PRIVATIZATION; NISKANEN, William A.; PUBLIC administration
- Publication
Public Administration Quarterly, 1996, Vol 20, Issue 1, p89
- ISSN
0734-9149
- Publication type
Article