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- Title
Ex post bidding and efficient coordination unemployment.
- Authors
Julien, Benoît; Kennes, John; King, Ian
- Abstract
We study the implementation of constrained-efficient allocations in labour markets where a basic coordination problem leads to an equilibrium matching friction. We argue that these allocations can be achieved in a non-cooperative equilibrium if wages are determined by ex post bidding. This holds true even in finite-sized markets where the equilibrium-matching process has decreasing returns to scale– where the‘Hosios rule’ does not apply– both with and without heterogeneity. JEL classification: D83, J64
- Subjects
UNEMPLOYMENT; LABOR; LABOR market; LABOR supply; EMPLOYEES
- Publication
Canadian Journal of Economics, 2005, Vol 38, Issue 1, p174
- ISSN
0008-4085
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/j.0008-4085.2005.00274.x