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- Title
Characterization of Vickrey auction with reserve price for multiple objects.
- Authors
Basu, Ranojoy; Mukherjee, Conan
- Abstract
This paper characterizes Vickrey auction with reserve price [VARP], in single and multiple objects settings, using normative and strategic axioms. In particular, it provides a new interpretation of reserve price as the infimum of a particular set of non-negative real numbers. In the single object case, we find that a strategyproof mechanism satisfies anonymity in welfare, agent sovereignty and non-bossiness in decision if and only if it has a VARP allocation rule. We extend this result to the multiple objects setting by introducing a continuity condition, and showing that any reasonable sale procedure (fixed prior to the realization of the number of available objects) involving continuous and strategyproof mechanisms that satisfy the aforementioned properties: must always use VARP with a fixed reserve price.
- Subjects
PRICES; FIXED prices; AUCTIONS; REAL numbers; ANONYMITY
- Publication
Review of Economic Design, 2023, Vol 27, Issue 4, p763
- ISSN
1434-4742
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s10058-022-00320-8