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- Title
PRICE AUCTION AND REGULATION IN EXPERIMENTAL BUILT HERITAGE CONSERVATION MARKET.
- Authors
Kean-Siang Ch'ng; Suet-Leng Khoo; Yoke-Mui Lim
- Abstract
This paper applied methods from experimental economics to allocate a limited amount of financial funds to conservation efforts of heritage house owners in George Town, Penang. We applied and compared two procurement auction mechanisms borrowing elements from Economic theory. In the first treatment, the conservation price was regulated and house owners were encouraged to submit their proposed works for grant consideration. The disbursement of the grant was made based on the number of works. In the second treatment, the conservation works were regulated and house owners were encouraged to submit their conservation price. The main findings illustrated that the market performance of the second mechanism was more cost effective than the first mechanism. This was because house owners in the first mechanism strategically gamed the auction by submitting low conservation efforts. As the result, conservation efforts were significantly overpaid. The results suggested the use of a mechanism which combined government's intervention on the type of conservation efforts and price allocation through market competition in heritage conservation policy.
- Subjects
GEORGE Town (Cayman Islands); EXPERIMENTAL economics; INDUSTRIAL procurement; ECONOMIC competition; LOANS; ECONOMIC history
- Publication
International Journal of Business & Society, 2014, Vol 15, Issue 2, p303
- ISSN
1511-6670
- Publication type
Article