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- Title
Modeling government behavior in collective bargaining: A test for self-interested bureaucrats.
- Authors
Brueckner, Jan K.; O'Brien, Kevin M.
- Abstract
This paper tests for self-interested behavior by local-government bureaucrats engaged in collective bargaining with public employee unions. A theoretical model is developed that shows the effect of Niskanen-style bureaucratic self-interest in the two standard bargaining models: the demand-constrained model and the efficient-bargain model. These predictions are then tested using national cross-section data on unionized police, fire, and sanitation workers.
- Subjects
COLLECTIVE bargaining; LABOR unions; CIVIL service; INDUSTRIAL relations; LOCAL government
- Publication
Public Choice, 1989, Vol 63, Issue 1, p15
- ISSN
0048-5829
- Publication type
Article