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- Title
Biological process, essential origin, and identity.
- Authors
Sartorelli, Joseph
- Abstract
In his famous essentialist account of identity, Kripke holds that it is necessary to the identity of individual people that they have the parents they do in fact have. Some have disputed this requirement, treating it either as a reason to reject essentialism or as something that should be eliminated in order to make essentialism stronger. I examine the reasoning behind some of these claims and argue that it fails to acknowledge the complex and multi-faceted importance of biological process in determining identity and distinguishing significant differences between biological and non-biological cases. In fact, this failure derives from an inherent tendency to treat the biological case in just the same way as the non-biological case at least at one important point in its history-the point of formation. This analysis offers a way of salvaging Kripke's original claims. I focus in particular on the views of Graeme Forbes and Teresa Robertson, but also discuss the views of Nathan Salmon, M. S. Price and E. J. Lowe.
- Subjects
IDENTITY (Philosophical concept); INDIVIDUALITY; ESSENTIALISM (Philosophy); SUBSTANCE (Philosophy); INDIVIDUAL differences
- Publication
Philosophical Studies, 2016, Vol 173, Issue 6, p1603
- ISSN
0031-8116
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s11098-015-0570-6