We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
The inadequacy of unitary characterizations of pain.
- Authors
Corns, Jennifer
- Abstract
Though pain scientists now understand pain to be a complex experience typically composed of sensation, emotion, cognition, and motivational responses, many philosophers maintain that pain is adequately characterized by one privileged aspect of this complexity. Philosophically dominant unitary accounts of pain as a sensation or perception are here evaluated by their ability to explain actual cases-and found wanting. Further, it is argued that no forthcoming unitary characterization of pain is likely to succeed. Instead, I contend that both the motivating intuitions behind unitary accounts and the wide range of pain phenomena are best accommodated by a componential view of pain that does not privilege any single component as necessary or sufficient.
- Subjects
PAIN &; psychology; SENSES; EMOTIONS &; cognition; MOTIVATION (Psychology); QUALIA; ILLUSION (Philosophy)
- Publication
Philosophical Studies, 2014, Vol 169, Issue 3, p355
- ISSN
0031-8116
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s11098-013-0186-7