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- Title
Reasoning and Threatening: A Reply to Yoos.
- Authors
Van de Vate, Dwight
- Abstract
This article discusses the concept of fallacious reasoning. An informal fallacy is an argument which plausibly substitutes irrelevant for relevant premises. An argument or proof seems to have a certain integrity, for it can be assume that the only way to understand one is to understand all of it and to understand it all by oneself. When a process reasoning is presented to someone as just that, a process of reasoning whoever presents it, assumes that he to whom it is presented can understand all of it, all by himself, and without needing anything further to complete his understanding of it. One addresses them as an ultimate court of appeal. They are irreducible and indivisible units of reasoning. In general the traditional informal fallacies concerns the game of reasoning. An informal fallacy is supposed to be not simply a cheat, but a plausible cheat, a cheat which might fool someone. Logicians have been uneasy about admitting that the argumentum ad baculum is indeed a fallacy. Threats seldom are reasons for warranting theoretically true or factually true contentions. The study of reasoning is self-referring. We cannot talk about the game of reasoning without playing it. When we play it with one another, we credit one another with proper, praiseworthy, and pacific intentions, for otherwise no one will play.
- Subjects
REASONING; LOGICAL fallacies; THREATS; THOUGHT &; thinking; APPEAL to force (Logical fallacy)
- Publication
Philosophy & Rhetoric, 1975, Vol 8, Issue 3, p177
- ISSN
0031-8213
- Publication type
Article