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- Title
THE FREE RIDER PROBLEM AND A SOCIAL CUSTOM MODEL OF TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP.
- Authors
Booth, Alison L.
- Abstract
This paper focuses on the free rider problem and a social custom model of trade union membership. The free rider hypothesis has a long history in economic thought. As early as 1848, the free rider potential of any group of workers was perceived by J. S. Mill. However, it appears that it was not until 1965 that an attempt was made to explain why large groups providing collective goods manage to exist despite the free rider problem. The aims of this paper is to show that a trade union can exist without compulsory membership and union shop legislation, to prove that under certain conditions the economic incentive to free ride can be less than the economic incentive to join a large union, in the absence of compulsion and to incorporate sociological factors into the traditional utility-maximizing model, in what will be called below a social custom theory of large union membership.
- Subjects
ORGANIZATIONAL behavior; LABOR unions; SOCIOECONOMICS; MARGINAL utility; MEMBERSHIP; MEMBERSHIP in associations, institutions, etc.; MANNERS &; customs
- Publication
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1985, Vol 100, Issue 1, p253
- ISSN
0033-5533
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.2307/1885744