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- Title
PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAMES WITH SOME TROUBLEMAKERS IN A RANDOM NETWORK.
- Authors
YANG, ZHI-XUAN; WANG, XUE-QING; HUANG, XIAO-LI; BU, SHOU-LIANG
- Abstract
We further study the competition among loner, cooperative and defective strategies by considering an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma (PD) game with some troublemakers in the random network by means of Monte Carlo simulations. It can be observed that the frequency of cooperators (fc) decreases with increasing of loners' (e) and defectors' payoffs (b). In particular, fc has a sharp decline when the loners' payoffs approximate 1.0. In addition, we find that introduction of troublemaker strategies prevents the uniform defection in the spatial evolutionary PD games for large b values and small e values. In practice, it also prevents cooperative strategies and defective strategies from vanishing for large e values.
- Subjects
PRISONER'S dilemma game; MONTE Carlo method; COOPERATION; DEFECTION; GAME theory
- Publication
International Journal of Modern Physics C: Computational Physics & Physical Computation, 2009, Vol 20, Issue 3, p491
- ISSN
0129-1831
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1142/S012918310901373X