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- Title
FALLACIOUSNESS AND INVALIDITY.
- Authors
Abaté, Charles J.; Verene, Donald Phillip
- Abstract
This article deals with the invalidity condition of fallaciousness. At the outset, any preservation of the invalidity condition of fallaciousness by appeal to relevant type-indicators requires the stipulation that arguments in the epistemic mode are either valid or invalid. A fallacious argument simply is an argument whose premises, even if true, fail to provide conclusive justification for knowledge of the truth of its conclusion. On this reading, then, epistemically invalid means fallacious, and thus it comes as no surprise that epistemic invalidity is a necessary condition for fallaciousness of arguments in the epistemic mode. To the extent that type-specification of arguments preserves the invalidity condition of fallaciousness, such a maneuver seems trivial and philosophically insignificant. The question whether deductive, or even inductive, invalidity is a necessary condition for fallaciousness, on the other hand, it is an interesting and philosophically important question, but there is plenty of evidence to suggest that this latter implication does not hold. If these considerations assist in cutting formal logic and the informal fallacies asunder, perhaps that is so much the worse for the informal fallacies.
- Subjects
LOGICAL fallacies; JUSTIFICATION (Christian theology); THEORY of knowledge; LOGIC; PHILOSOPHY
- Publication
Philosophy & Rhetoric, 1979, Vol 12, Issue 4, p262
- ISSN
0031-8213
- Publication type
Article