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- Title
The Presentational Use of Descriptions.
- Authors
Hicks, Michael R
- Abstract
Discussing Keith Donnellan's distinction between attributive and referential uses of descriptions, Gareth Evans considered a speaker he found it natural to describe as having "given expression to" a singular thought, though he insisted she was not referring to the person she has in mind. On accounts otherwise similar to Evans's, to express a singular thought just is to refer. Thus, as he does not explain why this speaker might speak this way, it is tempting to ignore this as a slip. On the contrary, I shall argue, Evans has good reason to deny that picture of reference. My interest, though, is in the case itself. It turns out it is a presentational use of descriptions: it provides its audience a cognitive ability they would otherwise lack. This characterization raises deep theoretical questions which I only begin to address here. My goal is to show that we ought to address those questions, for there is no better way of understanding examples like Evans's than to see them as presentational.
- Subjects
COGNITIVE ability
- Publication
Analytic Philosophy, 2019, Vol 60, Issue 4, p361
- ISSN
2153-9596
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/phib.12155