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- Title
Against Mereological Nominalism: Reply to Effingham.
- Authors
Cumpa, Javier; Declos, Alexandre
- Abstract
Mereological Nominalism, as traditionally understood, states (1) that properties are mereological wholes and (2) that instantiation is mereological. Thus defined, this view faces a number of well-known issues, which make it virtually untenable. Recently, Effingham (Philos Phenom Res 100(1):160–185, 2020) has offered an alternative account of Mereological Nominalism, which intends to avoid these problems by accepting (1) while rejecting (2). In this paper, we argue that this theory is not viable for two main reasons. First, it faces a threat of circularity. Second, the various non-mereological accounts of instantiation envisioned by Effingham in order to replace (2) seem inconsistent with (1).
- Subjects
NOMINALISM
- Publication
Synthese, 2021, Vol 199, Issue 3/4, p8991
- ISSN
0039-7857
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s11229-021-03191-8