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- Title
Refusal to Deal, Intellectual Property Rights, and Antitrust.
- Authors
Chen, Yongmin
- Abstract
A vertically integrated firm, having acquired the intellectual property (IP) through innovation to become an input monopolist, can extract surplus by supplying efficient downstream competitors. That the monopolist would refuse to do so is puzzling and has led to numerous debates in antitrust. In this article, I clarify the economic logic of refusal to deal and identify conditions under which prohibiting such conduct would raise or lower consumer and social welfare. I further show how IP protection (as determined by IP laws) and restrictions on IP holders’ conduct (as determined by antitrust laws) may interact to affect innovation incentive and post-innovation market performance. (JEL K2, L4, O3).
- Subjects
UNITED States; INTELLECTUAL property; ANTITRUST law; REFUSAL to deal (Law); MONOPOLIES; CONSUMER protection; ECONOMICS
- Publication
Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 2014, Vol 30, Issue 3, p533
- ISSN
8756-6222
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1093/jleo/ewt004