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- Title
Worker Absenteeism in Search Equilibrium.
- Authors
Engström, Per; Holmlund, Bertil
- Abstract
In this paper we introduce a general equilibrium model of search unemployment that incorporates absence from work as a distinct labor force state. Absenteeism is driven by random shocks to the value of leisure that are private information to the workers. Firms maximize profits while recognizing that the compensation package may affect the queue of job applicants and the absence rate. The analysis provides results concerning the effects of social insurance benefits and other determinants of workers' and firms' behavior. The normative analysis identifies externalities associated with firm-provided sick pay and examines the welfare implications of alternative policies.
- Subjects
JOB absenteeism; EMPLOYMENT; SOCIAL security; LABOR supply; LAND tenure; PROBLEM employees; JOB applications; EXTERNALITIES; COMPENSATION (Psychology)
- Publication
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2007, Vol 109, Issue 3, p439
- ISSN
0347-0520
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/j.1467-9442.2007.00501.x