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- Title
The Costs and Benefits of a Separation of Powers—An Incomplete Contracts Approach.
- Authors
Fuchs, Kira; Herold, Florian
- Abstract
The separation of the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers is a key principle in most democratic constitutions. We analyze the costs and benefits of separating legislature and executive in an incomplete contracts model: the executive can decide to implement public projects. Under separation of powers, the legislature sets up a decision-making framework that leaves the executive with the residual decision-making rights. Separation of powers is the more beneficial, the larger the danger of extreme policy preferences of the residual political decision maker.
- Subjects
SEPARATION of powers; DEMOCRATIZATION; LEGISLATIVE bodies; JUDICIAL councils; EXECUTIVE power; STATISTICAL decision making
- Publication
American Law & Economics Review, 2011, Vol 13, Issue 1, p131
- ISSN
1465-7252
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1093/aler/ahq016