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- Title
Knowledge from Falsehood, Ignorance of Necessary Truths, and Safety.
- Authors
Zhao, Bin
- Abstract
According to the safety account of knowledge, one knows that p only if one's belief could not easily have been false. An important issue for the account is whether we should only examine the target belief when evaluating whether a belief is safe or not. In this paper, it is argued that, if we should only examine the target belief, then the account fails to account for ignorance of necessary truths. But, if we should also examine beliefs in other relevant propositions, then the account fails to account for knowledge from falsehood. Therefore, the safety account of knowledge is undermined by knowledge from falsehood and ignorance of necessary truths.
- Subjects
TRUTHFULNESS &; falsehood; INFERENCE (Logic); IGNORANCE (Theory of knowledge); EPISTEMIC logic; CONCEPTION in literature
- Publication
Philosophia, 2022, Vol 50, Issue 2, p833
- ISSN
0048-3893
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s11406-021-00410-x