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- Title
A non-cooperative mechanism for the Shapley value of airport problems.
- Authors
Albizuri, M.; Echarri, J.; Zarzuelo, J.
- Abstract
In this paper we address the question of how to allocate the total cost of building and maintaining an airport runway among its users based on a non-cooperative approach. We present a non-cooperative bargaining game with a unique Nash equilibrium outcome whose payoffs are the Shapley value of an airport problem. Furthermore, it is shown that all strategy profiles leading to a subgame perfect equilibrium in these games are also coalition-proof.
- Subjects
COST allocation; RUNWAYS (Aeronautics); NONCOOPERATIVE games (Mathematics); NASH equilibrium; RESOURCE allocation; MANAGEMENT
- Publication
Annals of Operations Research, 2015, Vol 235, Issue 1, p1
- ISSN
0254-5330
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s10479-015-1981-7