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- Title
For better or worse: The roles of power in models of distribution within marriage.
- Authors
Pollak, Robert A.
- Abstract
The article focuses on roles of power in models of distribution of within marriage and, more generally, distribution between women and men. Economists have three alternative models of distribution within marriage: altruist model, cooperative bargaining models, and noncooperative bargaining models. The altruist model remains the leader. It implies that the equilibrium distribution maximizes the utility of the altruist subject to the family's resource constraint. Cooperative bargaining models are exemplified by the "divorce- threat" models and by the "separate-spheres" model. In divorce-threat models the threat point is the utility each spouse would receive in the event of divorce; thus, the threat point is external to the marriage. In the separate-spheres model, the threat point is internal to the marriage and, more specifically, is the equilibrium of a noncooperative game in which the quantities of household public goods are determined by voluntary contributions by the spouses. Noncooperative models of distribution within marriage are less common than cooperative models.
- Subjects
DISTRIBUTION (Economic theory); MARRIAGE &; economics; POWER (Philosophy); MARRIAGE; NONCOOPERATIVE games (Mathematics); NEOCLASSICAL school of economics; GAME theory
- Publication
American Economic Review, 1994, Vol 84, Issue 2, p148
- ISSN
0002-8282
- Publication type
Article