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- Title
Pork-Barreling without Reelection? Evidence from the Mexican Congress.
- Authors
Kerevel, Yann P.
- Abstract
Previous research on term-limited legislators suggests they have few incentives to engage in pork-barreling. Using the case of Mexico, where all legislators are term-limited, I find legislators participate in federal budget negotiations despite the lack of a reelection incentive. I argue term-limited legislators are progressively ambitious and use interventions into the budget process to further their careers. I find legislators elected in single-member districts submit more budget amendments than those elected through proportional representation, conditional on where they intend to pursue future office. I also find governors and gubernatorial elections influence the submission of budget amendments, which is related to gubernatorial influence over political careers.
- Subjects
MEXICO; EARMARKING (Public finance); MEXICO. Congreso; TERM of office of legislators; BUDGET process; TERM limits (Public office); LEGISLATIVE amendments; MEXICAN politics &; government, 2000-; ELECTIONS
- Publication
Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2015, Vol 40, Issue 1, p137
- ISSN
0362-9805
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/lsq.12068