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- Title
Contrastive Explanation, Efforts of Will, and Dual Responsibility: A Defense of Kane's Libertarian Theory.
- Authors
Campbell, Neil; Kadkhodapour, Jamal
- Abstract
Neil Levy mounts two arguments against Robert Kane's influential libertarian theory. According to the first, because Kanean self-forming actions are undetermined, there can be no contrastive explanation for why agents choose as they do rather than otherwise, in which case how they choose appears to be a matter of luck. According to the second, if one grants Kane the claim that agents are responsible for their undetermined choices in virtue of the fact that they made efforts of will to choose them, the fact that agents engage in dual efforts of will leads to an implausible doubling of the agent's responsibility. We defend Kane from both objections. We argue against the first by clarifying the nature of contrastive explanation in the context of Kane's theory and we argue against the second by showing that the kind of doubling of responsibility implied by an agent's dual efforts of will is, in fact, innocuous.
- Subjects
LIBERTARIANS; RESPONSIBILITY; EXPLANATION; LIBERTARIANISM; VIRTUES
- Publication
Acta Analytica, 2022, Vol 37, Issue 3, p415
- ISSN
0353-5150
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s12136-021-00498-6