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- Title
Reliabilism and the New Evil Demon Problem.
- Authors
Christmann, John Alton
- Abstract
Internalists who argue against reliabilism usually construct thought experiments designed to show how reliability is not necessary or sufficient for justification. Defenders of reliabilism have responded with debunking explanations of the intuitions that people are expected to have when considering anti-reliabilist thought experiments. One defender is Jennifer Nagel, who argues that internalist counterexamples to reliabilism play off of a shift between belief-formation processes that are unconscious and those that involve self-reflection on the contents of one's conscious states (Nagel 2016). Nagel aims to show how thought experiments commonly appealed to by internalists rest on a mistake by carefully examining some of the most well-known examples in the literature. However, Nagel's analysis does not apply on certain counterexamples to reliabilism, such as Cohen's New Evil Demon (NED) (Cohen 1984). In this paper, I will show that when applied to NED-intuitions, Nagel's analysis fails, so her argument does not extend to all anti-reliabilist counterexamples.
- Subjects
DEMONOLOGY; THOUGHT experiments; GOOD &; evil; EXPERIMENTAL design; INTROSPECTION
- Publication
Acta Analytica, 2021, Vol 36, Issue 1, p55
- ISSN
0353-5150
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s12136-020-00433-1