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- Title
The n-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations.
- Authors
Akin, S.; Platt, Brennan; Sertel, Murat
- Abstract
This study examines the behavior of simple n-person bargaining problems under pre-donations where the Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) solution is operant. Pre- donations are a unilateral commitment to transfer a portion of one's utility to someone else, and are used to distort the bargaining set and thereby influence the bargaining solution. In equilibrium, these pre-donations are Pareto-improving over the undistorted solution; moreover, when the agents' preferences are sufficiently distinct, the equilibrium solution coincides with the concessionary division rule.
- Subjects
COLLECTIVE bargaining; CONCESSION bargaining; ECONOMIC equilibrium; PARETO optimum; CONSUMER preferences; UTILITY theory
- Publication
Review of Economic Design, 2011, Vol 15, Issue 2, p147
- ISSN
1434-4742
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s10058-010-0106-7