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- Title
Wittgensteinian Pragmatism in Humean Concepts.
- Authors
Hommen, David
- Abstract
David Hume's and later Ludwig Wittgenstein's views on concepts are generally presented as standing in stark opposition to each other. In a nutshell, Hume's theory of concepts is taken to be subjectivistic and atomistic, while Wittgenstein is metonymic with a broadly pragmatistic and holistic doctrine that gained much attention during the second half of the 20th century. In this essay, I shall argue, however, that Hume's theory of concepts is indeed much more akin to the views of (post-Tractarian) Wittgenstein and his epigones than many, including Wittgenstein himself, probably might have suspected. As I try to show, Hume anticipates many themes central to Wittgenstein's writings on language and meaning, and actually takes initial steps towards both an anti-subjectivistic and anti-atomistic psychology and epistemology.
- Subjects
HUME, David, 1711-1776; WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig, 1889-1951; CONCEPTS; SUBJECTIVITY; LOGICAL atomism; PSYCHOLOGY &; philosophy
- Publication
Philosophia, 2016, Vol 44, Issue 1, p117
- ISSN
0048-3893
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s11406-015-9681-8