We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
Husserl's Phenomenalism: A Rejoinder to the Philipse-Zahavi Debate.
- Authors
Blouin, Philippe Setlakwe
- Abstract
The present paper explores anew the question of Husserl's metaphysics by contrasting H. Philipse and D. Zahavi's respective position on the matter. I argue that these positions fall victim to opposing exegetical pitfalls. On the one hand, while I concur with Philipse's general characterisation of Husserl as an ontological phenomenalist, I disagree that this implies Husserl was a subjective idealist similar to Berkeley. On the other hand, while Zahavi's correlationist interpretation of Husserl avoids this subjective idealist interpretation, I argue that it inadvertently succumbs to the realist alternative that construes the world as existing independently from subjectivity. The way out of this dilemma is to interpret Husserl as an experiential monist, where the phenomenal stream (Erlebnisstrom) is taken to be ontologically primary, by virtue of its antecedence over the subject-object or mind-world dichotomy.
- Subjects
PHENOMENALISM; HUSSERL, Edmund, 1859-1938; METAPHYSICS; REALISM; DILEMMA; IDEALISM; MONISM; SUBJECTIVITY
- Publication
Husserl Studies, 2023, Vol 39, Issue 3, p241
- ISSN
0167-9848
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s10743-023-09328-6