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- Title
THE REFUTATION OF INTENTIONALISM.
- Authors
BERTINI, Daniele
- Abstract
My purpose is to refute the intentionalist approach to perception. Drawing from mainstream literature, I identify a principle on which any version of intentional theory relies. My paper is a detailed attack on the truth of the principle. In the first section I will introduce terminology and will taxonomize various statements of the intentional view. In the second section I will briefly outline a sketch of the skeletal intentionalist theory that develops from the assumption of the principle alone. Then, in the third section, I will advance my reasons against this theory. In the fourth section, I will set forth an intuitive and definitive counterexample to the adequacy of the principle of intentionalism to accounting for ordinary perception. Moving from this, in the fifth section, I will provide some reasons explaining why intentionalism is condemned at being unsuccessful. Finally, in the last section of the paper, I will give my conclusions.
- Subjects
TERMS &; phrases; CONCEPTUALISM
- Publication
Logos & Episteme, 2023, Vol 14, Issue 4, p353
- ISSN
2069-0533
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.5840/logos-episteme202314428