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- Title
Subjective Validity, Self-Consciousness and Inner Experience: Comments on Kraus.
- Authors
Sethi, Janum
- Abstract
I raise three related objections to aspects of Katharina Kraus's interpretation in Kant on Self-Knowledge and Self-Formation. First, I reject her claim that representations count as merely subjectively valid for Kant if they represent objects from the contingent perspective of a particular subject. I argue that Kant in fact describes consciousness of subjectively valid representations as consciousness of one's own perceptions rather than of the objects perceived, and therefore that it plays a bigger role in his account of self-consciousness than Kraus allows. Second, whereas Kraus argues that the transcendental unity of apperception structures the content of any consciousness that is possible for a subject, I note that Kant also allows for a merely empirical unity of apperception, which he describes as in principle different from transcendental unity. Finally, I raise some worries for Kraus's suggestion that we can be aware of the activity of thinking through inner sense.
- Publication
Kantian Review, 2022, Vol 27, Issue 3, p461
- ISSN
1369-4154
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1017/S1369415422000188