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- Title
Multistage public education, voting, and income distribution.
- Authors
Naito, Katsuyuki; Nishida, Keigo
- Abstract
This paper proposes a theory to study the formulation of education policies and human capital accumulation. The government collects income taxes and allocates tax revenue to primary and higher education. The tax rate and the allocation rule are both endogenously determined through majority voting. The tax rate is kept at a low level, and public funding for higher education is not supported unless the majority of individuals have human capital above some threshold. Although public support for higher education promotes aggregate human capital accumulation, it may create long-run income inequality because the poor are excluded from higher education.
- Subjects
PUBLIC education; VOTING; INCOME inequality; HUMAN capital; TAX rates
- Publication
Journal of Economics, 2017, Vol 120, Issue 1, p65
- ISSN
0931-8658
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s00712-016-0513-5