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- Title
Grounding and the luck objection to agent-causal libertarianism.
- Authors
Archer, Joel
- Abstract
Many philosophers think there is a luck problem confronting libertarian models of free will. If free actions are undetermined, then it seems to be a matter of chance or luck that they occur—so the objection goes. Agent-causal libertarians have responded to this objection by asserting that free actions, in their essence, involve a direct causal relation between agents and the events they cause. So, free actions are not lucky after all. Not everyone, however, is convinced by this response. Al Mele and Peter van Inwagen, for instance, argue that luckiness remains even if agent-causation exists. One way to answer their arguments, I suggest, is by appealing to considerations in metaphysical grounding and the associated idea of explanatory priority. Mele's argument loses force if facts about which possible world is actual are partly grounded in facts about free choices themselves. And van Inwagen's challenge can be met if facts about free actions are explanatorily prior to any objective probabilities associated with those actions.
- Subjects
LIBERTARIANISM; FORTUNE; VAN Inwagen, Peter; MELE, Al; LIBERTARIANS
- Publication
Philosophical Studies, 2022, Vol 179, Issue 5, p1763
- ISSN
0031-8116
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s11098-021-01728-8