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- Title
Austerity, Psychology, and the Intelligibility of Nonsense.
- Authors
McManus, Denis
- Abstract
that the 'intelligibility' of philosophical confusion remains invisible to the kind of psychology that the 'sheer lack' interpretation would make available to Wittgenstein. These concerns relate to well-established worries concerning whether the Tractatus's 'ladder' can be climbed by thinking through arguments--or indeed by thinking full stop--if it is austerely nonsensical. Though I argue that these worries can be met, doing so requires another interpretation of 'austerity', which I call the 'equivocation' interpretation, and reveals the difference between resolute and non-resolute readings to be less clear cut than has been thought. Key here is the failure of some hard-and- fast distinctions that inform the literature--distinctions shaped by intuitions about mind, meaning, inference, logic, and nonsense--to serve us well.
- Subjects
PSYCHOLOGY surveys; PSYCHOLOGICAL criticism; COUNSELING; READING; READERS
- Publication
Philosophical Topics, 2014, Vol 42, Issue 2, p161
- ISSN
0276-2080
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.5840/philtopics201442223