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- Title
Do conservative central bankers weaken the chances of conservative politicians?
- Authors
Menuet, Maxime; Oriola, Hugo; Villieu, Patrick
- Abstract
In this paper, we challenge the claim that a conservative central bank strengthens the likelihood of a conservative government. In contrast, if an election is based on the comparative advantages of the candidates, an inflation-averse central banker can deter the chances of a conservative candidate because once inflation is removed, its comparative advantage in the fight against inflation disappears. We develop a theory based on a policy-mix game with electoral competition, predicting that a tighter monetary policy reduces the chances of a conservative (i.e., inflation-adverse) party while enhancing the chances for a liberal party. To test these predictions, we examine monthly data of British political history between 1987 and 2015, and show that an increase in the interest rate in the 10 months preceding a national election decreases the popularity of a Tory government. Our analysis on a panel of six OECD countries reveals that a pre-election increase of 1 percentage point in the main targeted interest rate rises the popularity of liberal parties by around 3.43 percentage points relative to its trend.
- Subjects
BANKERS; MONETARY policy; BRITISH history; CONSERVATIVES; POLITICIANS
- Publication
Social Choice & Welfare, 2024, Vol 62, Issue 4, p681
- ISSN
0176-1714
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s00355-024-01509-2