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- Title
No Show Paradox in Condorcet k-voting Procedures.
- Authors
Pérez, Joaquín; Jimeno, José; García, Estefanía
- Abstract
In this paper we extend the negative known results about No Show Paradox in Condorcet voting functions and correspondences to the contexts of k-functions and k-correspondences, in which the outcome of the voting process is a unique k-committee (set of k candidates) or a family of k-committees. The main result of the paper states that for every Condorcet k-function and for every Condorcet k-correspondence, there are situations in which every optimistic or pessimistic voter with some specific preferences could manipulate the election by abstaining.
- Subjects
VOTING; VOTING abstention; VOTERS; ELECTIONS; POLITICAL candidates; SOCIAL choice; LEGISLATIVE bodies
- Publication
Group Decision & Negotiation, 2012, Vol 21, Issue 3, p291
- ISSN
0926-2644
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s10726-010-9191-9