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- Title
Ungewissheit als Grenze von Interessenbargaining in industriellen Beziehungen.
- Authors
Schröder, Martin
- Abstract
The literature about concession bargaining implies that the management of a company knows how to pursue its interests optimally and that it demands corresponding concessions from labor representatives. However, economic decisions are made under conditions of uncertainty. Management cannot usually calculate how optimally to pursue its interests: it is impossible to calculate whether a relocation will be successful, to cite a well-documented example. Whether one side or the other makes concessions is therefore not a question of objective economic data or power relations, but of their interpretation. How a situation is interpreted in turn depends on what arguments are accepted as appropriate. In contrast to the conventional assumptions in the literature, I stress that rather than simply bargaining about well-defined and fixed interests, management and labor also discuss and redefine what they consider to be in their own and their opponents' interest. To illustrate this point I cite two companies that chose opposite strategies under similar economic circumstances and justified their actions in each case as being economically rational.
- Subjects
CONCESSION bargaining; MANAGEMENT; INDUSTRIAL relations; DECISION making; CONCESSIONS (Administrative law)
- Publication
Industrielle Beziehungen, 2010, Vol 2010, Issue 3, p261
- ISSN
0943-2779
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1688/1862-0035-IndB-2010-03-Schroeder