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- Title
Sequential Information Design.
- Authors
Doval, Laura; Ely, Jeffrey C.
- Abstract
We study games of incomplete information as both the information structure and the extensive form vary. An analyst may know the payoff‐relevant data but not the players' private information, nor the extensive form that governs their play. Alternatively, a designer may be able to build a mechanism from these ingredients. We characterize all outcomes that can arise in an equilibrium of some extensive form with some information structure. We show how to specialize our main concept to capture the additional restrictions implied by extensive‐form refinements.
- Subjects
INFORMATION design; EQUILIBRIUM
- Publication
Econometrica, 2020, Vol 88, Issue 6, p2575
- ISSN
0012-9682
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.3982/ECTA17260