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- Title
INFORMATION ACQUISITION AND EFFICIENT MECHANISM DESIGN.
- Authors
Bergemann, Dirk; Välimäki, Juuso
- Abstract
We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert) information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a mechanism exists that provides the efficient incentives for information acquisition ex-ante and implements the efficient allocation conditional on the private information ex-post. It is shown that in every private value environment the Vickrey-Clark-ciroves mechanism guarantees both ex-ante as well as ex-post efficiency. In contrast, with common values, ex-ante and ex-post efficiency cannot be reconciled in general. Sufficient conditions in terms of sub- and supermodularity are provided when (all) ex-post efficient mechanisms lead to private under- or over-acquisition of information.
- Subjects
AUCTIONS; SURETYSHIP &; guaranty; ACQUISITION of databases; INFORMATION resources management; INFORMATION resources; INFORMATION retrieval
- Publication
Econometrica, 2002, Vol 70, Issue 3, p1007
- ISSN
0012-9682
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/1468-0262.00317