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- Title
Action explanation and its presuppositions.
- Authors
O'brien, Lilian
- Abstract
In debates about rationalizing action explanation causalists assume that the psychological states that explain an intentional action have both causal and rational features. I scrutinize the presuppositions of those who seek and offer rationalizing action explanations. This scrutiny shows, I argue, that where rational features play an explanatory role in these contexts, causal features play only a presuppositional role. But causal features would have to play an explanatory role if rationalizing action explanation were a species of causal explanation. Consequently, it is not a species of causal explanation.
- Subjects
RATIONALIZATION (Psychology); EXPLANATION; CAUSATION (Philosophy); INTELLIGIBILITY of speech; DISTRACTION
- Publication
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2019, Vol 49, Issue 1, p123
- ISSN
0045-5091
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1080/00455091.2018.1518629