We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
Minimum Wages and Trainers' Dilemma.
- Authors
Eguchi, Kyota
- Abstract
This paper examines how a minimum wage, viewed as an incentive to trainers, would affect the informal help provided through on-the-job training. In the work environment, experienced employees play a significant role in training new employees. However, the more help they provide to trainees, the less likely that the trainers themselves will be promoted. This is the trainer's dilemma: help trainees or work for promotion. We show that a minimum wage alleviates the trainer's dilemma, as it increases the earnings of non-promoted workers and reduces the net benefit of promotion for experienced employees. Hence, minimum wage regulation encourages informal help and enhances welfare, although it reduces the firm's profit.
- Subjects
MINIMUM wage; WAGE differentials; INCOME maintenance programs; OCCUPATIONAL training; CAREER education; CONTINUING education; QUALITY of work life; CORPORATE profits; WORK environment
- Publication
LABOUR: Review of Labour Economics & Industrial Relations, 2010, Vol 24, Issue 2, p128
- ISSN
1121-7081
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/j.1467-9914.2010.00476.x