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- Title
Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency.
- Authors
Öztürk, Z. Emel
- Abstract
We consider a collective choice problem in which the number of alternatives and the number of voters vary. Two fundamental axioms of consistency in such a setting, reinforcement and composition-consistency, are incompatible. We first observe that the latter implies four conditions each of which can be formulated as a consistency axiom on its own right. We find that two of these conditions are compatible with reinforcement. In fact, one of these, called composition-consistency with respect to non-clone winners, turns out to characterize a class of scoring rules which contains the Plurality rule. When combined with a requirement of monotonicity, composition-consistency with respect to non-clone winners uniquely characterizes the Plurality rule. A second implication of composition-consistency leads to a class of scoring rules that always select a Plurality winner when combined with monotonicity.
- Subjects
SOCIAL choice; AXIOMS
- Publication
International Journal of Game Theory, 2020, Vol 49, Issue 3, p801
- ISSN
0020-7276
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s00182-020-00711-7