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- Title
Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry.
- Authors
Miralles, Antonio
- Abstract
Campbell (J Econ Theory 82:425–450, 1998) develops a self-enforced collusion mechanism in simultaneous auctions based on complete comparative cheap talk and endogenous entry, with two bidders. His result is difficult to generalize to an arbitrary number of bidders, since the entry-decision stage of the game is characterized by strategic substitutes. This paper analyzes more-than-two-bidder, symmetric-prior cases. Two results are proved: (1) as the number of objects grows large, a full comparative cheap talk equilibrium exists and it yields asymptotically fully efficient collusion; and (2) there is always a partial comparative cheap talk equilibrium. All these results are supported by intuitive equilibria at the entry-decision stage (J Econ Theory 130:205–219, 2006; Math Soc Sci 2008, forthcoming). Numerical examples suggest that full comparative cheap talk equilibria are not uncommon even with few objects.
- Subjects
COLLUSION; AUCTIONS; BIDDERS; BIDS; ARBITRARY constants
- Publication
Economic Theory, 2010, Vol 42, Issue 3, p523
- ISSN
0938-2259
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s00199-008-0403-3