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- Title
Constitutional Penumbras and Prophylactic Rights: The Right to Counsel and the "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree".
- Authors
Cantrell, Michael A.
- Abstract
This Article argues that a non-coercive right to counsel violation under Miranda and Edwards does not implicate "fruit of the poisonous tree" suppression of evidence. A Miranda/Edwards violation takes place when a suspect in police custody invokes his right to counsel and the police subsequently initiate further conversation without making counsel available. The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine holds that "second generation" derivative evidence must be excluded if it is acquired as a result of "first generation" evidence obtained by constitutionally impermissible means. For example, suppose a murder suspect under interrogation invokes his right to counsel, but later an officer mistakenly re-initiates questioning without making counsel available to him. The suspect then confesses and reveals the location of the murder weapon. The confession (as first-generation evidence) is properly excluded pursuant to the Miranda/Edwards exclusionary rule. However, contrary to the holdings of various lower courts, the "fruit of the poisonous tree" suppression doctrine does not operate to exclude the murder weapon because no constitutional violation has occurred. The Article further analyzes various ways in which courts might be misled to hold that a non-coercive Miranda/Edwards violation triggers the fruit of the poisonous tree suppression doctrine.
- Subjects
UNITED States; MIRANDA v. Arizona; EDWARDS v. Arizona (Supreme Court case); DUE process of law; SUPPRESSION of evidence; CONSTITUTIONAL law; CONFESSION (Law)
- Publication
American Journal of Criminal Law, 2013, Vol 40, Issue 2, p111
- ISSN
0092-2315
- Publication type
Article