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- Title
Voters' commitment problem and reforms in welfare programs.
- Authors
Hollanders, David; Vis, Barbara
- Abstract
When will a vote-seeking government pursue unpopular welfare reforms that are likely to cost it votes? Using a game-theoretical model, we show that a government enacts reforms that are unpopular with the median voter during bad economic times, but not during good ones. The key reason is that voters cannot commit to re-elect a government that does not reform during bad times. This voters' commitment problem stems from economic voting, i.e., voters' tendency to punish the government for a poorly performing economy. The voter commitment problem provides an explanation for the empirical puzzle that governments sometimes enact reforms that voters oppose.
- Subjects
VOTER psychology; COMMITMENT (Psychology); PUBLIC welfare; GAME theory; ECONOMIC voting; PUBLIC opinion polls
- Publication
Public Choice, 2013, Vol 155, Issue 3/4, p433
- ISSN
0048-5829
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s11127-011-9872-1