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- Title
Epistemology without guidance.
- Authors
Hughes, Nick
- Abstract
Epistemologists often appeal to the idea that a normative theory must provide useful, usable, guidance to argue for one normative epistemology over another. I argue that this is a mistake. Guidance considerations have no role to play in theory choice in epistemology. I show how this has implications for debates about the possibility and scope of epistemic dilemmas, the legitimacy of idealisation in Bayesian epistemology, uniqueness versus permissivism, sharp versus mushy credences, and internalism versus externalism.
- Subjects
THEORY of knowledge; NORMATIVE theory (Communication); PROBABILISM; UNIQUENESS (Philosophy); BAYESIAN analysis
- Publication
Philosophical Studies, 2022, Vol 179, Issue 1, p163
- ISSN
0031-8116
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s11098-021-01655-8