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- Title
Lobbying paradox of strategic export policy in a differentiated duopoly.
- Authors
Teng Kun Wang
- Abstract
This paper presents an analysis of lobbying based on imperfect competition by using three-stage game. It seeks to explain why lobbying efforts might be influenced by a home government's viewpoint. Endogenously determined lobbying may distort the outcomes of strategic export policy, so that the results would differ from that generated by exogenously set lobbying. The lobbying paradox results in the domestic firm being worse off than if it could credibly commit to not engage in lobbying. Moreover, in the presence of foreign firm lobbying, the desired tax level is as the same as that of the benchmark case without lobbying.
- Subjects
LOBBYING; EXPORT laws; COMMERCIAL policy; FOREIGN corporations; EXPORT duties; TAX rates; ECONOMICS
- Publication
International Economics & Economic Policy, 2011, Vol 8, Issue 3, p323
- ISSN
1612-4804
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s10368-010-0175-7