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- Title
Kant and the Pre-Conceptual Use of the Understanding.
- Authors
Indregard, Jonas Jervell
- Abstract
Does Kant hold that we can have intuitions independently of concepts? A striking passage from § 13 of the Critique of Pure Reason appears to say so explicitly. However, it also conjures up a scenario where the categories are inapplicable to objects of intuition, a scenario presumably shown impossible by the following Transcendental Deduction. The seemingly non-conceptualist claim concerning intuition have therefore been read, by conceptualist interpreters of Kant, as similarly counterpossible. I argue that the passage in question best supports an underappreciated middle position where intuition requires a pre-conceptual use of the understanding. Such pre-conceptual use of the understanding faces both textual and systematic objections. I show that these objections can be rebutted.
- Subjects
COMPREHENSION; TRANSLATORS; CONCEPTS; MAGIC tricks
- Publication
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 2021, Vol 103, Issue 1, p93
- ISSN
0003-9101
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1515/agph-2017-0125