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- Title
Elgin's community-oriented steadfastness.
- Authors
Kraay, Klaas J.
- Abstract
In recent years, epistemologists have devoted enormous attention to this question: what should happen when two epistemic peers disagree about the truth-value of some proposition? Some have argued that that in all such cases, both parties are rationally required to revise their position in some way. Others have maintained that, in at least some cases, neither party is rationally required to revise her position. In this paper, I examine a provocative and under-appreciated argument for the latter view due to Elgin (in: Feldman and Warfield (eds) Disagreement, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 53–68, 2010; The Philosopher's Magazine, fourth quarter, pp 77–82, 2012; True enough, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2017; in: Johnson (ed) Voicing dissent: the ethics and epistemology of making disagreement public, Routledge, New York, pp 10–21, 2018). I defend it against a series of objections, and I then identify some fruitful ways in which her view could be developed further.
- Subjects
ELGIN (Ill.); PERSEVERANCE (Ethics); PHILOSOPHERS; THEORY of knowledge; ETHICS
- Publication
Synthese, 2021, Vol 198, Issue 6, p4985
- ISSN
0039-7857
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s11229-019-02384-6