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- Title
Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes.
- Authors
POTTERS, JAN; SUETENS, SIGRID
- Abstract
We conduct a laboratory experiment aimed at examining whether strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity have an impact on the tendency to cooperate in finitely repeated two-player games with a Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium. We find that there is significantly more cooperation when actions exhibit strategic complementarities than in the case of strategic substitutes. The difference is to some extent driven by a difference in the speed with which some pairs reach stable full cooperation, but mainly by differences in choices of pairs that do not succeed in reaching full cooperation.
- Subjects
COOPERATION; NASH equilibrium; HUMAN experimentation; SUBSTITUTE players; STARTING players; GAMES; SPEED; MILITARY strategy; COMPLEMENTARY needs
- Publication
Review of Economic Studies, 2009, Vol 76, Issue 3, p1125
- ISSN
0034-6527
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00548.x