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- Title
Matching with Nonexclusive Contracts †.
- Authors
Ripperger-Suhler, Daniel
- Abstract
A variety of empirical papers document the coexistence of exclusive and nonexclusive contracts within a given market across a multitude of industries. However, the theoretical literature has not been able to generate a differentiable model with the coexistence of these contracts. I rectify the gap in the literature by developing a theoretical model of two-sided matching, in which principals and agents choose between exclusive and nonexclusive contracts with cost-of-effort inefficiencies. I find that the coexistence of contracts relies on cost-sharing between principals, relative bargaining power, and an endogenous outside option. I also find that the pattern of contracts is monotonic with respect to the type distributions of principals and agents.
- Subjects
EXCLUSIVE contracts; AGENCY (Law); CONTRACTS; BARGAINING power; CONTRACT theory
- Publication
Games (20734336), 2024, Vol 15, Issue 2, p11
- ISSN
2073-4336
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.3390/g15020011