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- Title
Against Foundationalism about Persistence-Conditions.
- Authors
FRANKEN, DIRK
- Abstract
In this paper I will argue against a view that I call foundationalism about persistence-conditions. The core of this view is that composite physical objects have their specific persistence-conditions in virtue of these conditions being fulfilled by the object's physical constituents at various times. I will provide two arguments - the argument from the possibility of instantaneous objects and the argument from the presence of persistence-conditions - which show that this view is untenable. These arguments will also point towards a more adequate understanding of what it means for an object to have certain persistence-conditions. I will expound this understanding and suggest, on its basis, an unorthodox, hylomorphist account of the persistence-conditions of objects.
- Subjects
FOUNDATIONALISM (Theory of knowledge); SWINBURNE, Richard; HYLOMORPHISM; SUBSTANCE (Philosophy); PERSISTENCE
- Publication
Kriterion, 2018, Vol 32, Issue 1, p1
- ISSN
1019-8288
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1515/krt-2018-320102